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The period of the New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union 
(1921-1928) is commonly understood as one of great social and 
political transformation. Following the enormous economic and 
social turmoil of the revolution and civil war, the New Economic 
Policy was an effort to relax some controls over the economy and 
to turn away from the military construction of a new socialist 
state towards the social and educational transformation of 
society. One of the main areas of struggle for social 
transformation was in the realm of youth culture. The 
activities, behavior and values of the first post-revolutionary 
generation proved to be an important battlefield in the struggle 
for communist hegemony and socialist transformation during NEP. 
Youth cultures were sometimes allied with the dominant Bolshevik 
culture, as in the case of the Communist Youth League, the 
Komosomol, and sometimes resisted this dominant culture, 
emphasizing in their behavior, values and customs an 
unwillingness to accommodate to Bolshevik ideals. 
A study of youth'cultures is essential to our understanding 
of both the opportunities and challenges the Bolsheviks faced in 
trying to create a new unifying culture of communism. Youth 
appeared to provided an opportunity in so far as the Party saw 
the younger generation as one of the most active and 
revolutionary parts of the working class and peasantry. Youth 
"represents our country's future and is the bearer of that 
future," Stalin argued in 1924. During and after the revolution, 
youth served as an important metaphor for social change, 
symbolizing both the energy and initiative needed to carry out 
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the revolution, and that group of new socialist men and women who 
would actually live to see a new world. For the Bolsheviks, 
youth was in some senses the guarantor of future social hegemony, 
in so far as the younger generation would be able to replicate 
and even advance the ideology and culture of the Bolshevik party. 
This 'focus on ~outh was especially understandable if one sees 
hegemony as a process, or a "moving equilibrium" as Gramsci 
called it, and not a status quo. 
However, youth cultures had the potential to challenge as 
well as champion the desired cultural consensus of the 
Bolsheviks. While references to an almost mythical youth of the 
ideal socialist society predominated in official discourse 
throughout the decade and a half following the revolution, there 
was simultaneously very real concern with those elements of youth 
culture which apppeared to threaten this model of the ideal young 
socialist. There was a constant conflict in the party between 
appreciation for youth's initiative, energy and ability, and 
concern to keep control over the wide range of youth cultures 
-- 
which resisted party domination. As a lead article from ~ravda 
stated in 1923: 
These young people are our hope. These young people 
will be the replacement of our old guard. But at the 
same time it is just these young people who...can much 
more easily than any other group ... be subjected to 
ideological influences alien,to Marxism. 
The Bolsheviks implicitly recognized that the struggle for 
hegemony meant not just overcoming overt political opposition but 
also influencing the whole range of youths' behavior, values, and 
ideals. Indeed, entire areas of youths' everyday behavior, 
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manners, language, dress, and sexual relafions were taken out of 
the private realm and became part of political discourse. The 
foxtrotting cafe life of bohemian NEP youth was considered 
counter-revolutionary, associated with decadent sexual behavior, 
bourgeois wealth and frivolity. Drinking and smoking were 
criticized as decadent and harmful to the revolution because they 
threatened youths' health and decreased their energy for work. 
Even the youthful cult of the popular poet Sergei Esenin was 
criticized as leading to withdrawn and a-political youth who 
preferred to read poetry rather than study Marxism. Although 
these areas of youth culture were not explicitly oppositional in 
an organized political sense, the implied rebelliousness was 
considered a threat to communist morality and to the revolution. 
Rather than trying to reestablish the party's moral 
dominance through force, the Bolsheviks largely relied on their 
ability to create consent through Marxist education and the 
redirection of leisure activities. The party tried, as Stuart 
Hall says dominant cultures always do, "to reorganize popular 
culture; to enclose and confine its definitions and forms within 
a more inclusive range of dominant forms." ("~otes on 
~econstructing the Popular," p. 233.) Bukharin argued that the 
party must respond to expressions of "hooliganism" and degeneracy 
with clear rules of behavior and the forceful instruction of 
youth in proper communist morality. Now that the. revolution had 
been achieved, Bukharin said, and there was nothing left to rebel 
against, it was inappropriate for youth to continue with 
undisciplined and negative acts. Trying to extinguish youth 
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culture in favor of other more accommodating and supportive ones, 
the party urged the Komsomol to widen its club and educational 
activities and to emphasize ideals such as honor, cleanliness, 
comradeship rather than sexuality, and friendly competition. 
However, despite these efforts to control youth, 
nonconforming youth cultures persisted throughout the 1920's. 
They revealed an enormous division between the ideals of the 
dominant Bolshevik culture and the reality of youth cultures. 
The discrepancy between ideals and reality was particularly 
evident in the area of juvenile criminality and homelessness. 
The ideal abstractions of a youth thriving in freedom from 
bourgeois influence were an impossible illusion in a period when 
millions of homeless and criminal youth had been produced by the 
combined -trials of revolution, war, famine and unemployment. In 
1922, there were almost 7 million besprizorniki, or homeless 
youth, compared with only a quarter of a million members of the 
Komsomol. The bespr . . izorniki formed an active and independent 
street culture of their own with their own customs, ritual, 
jargon, and systems of organization. I'd like to look briefly at 
two areas of delinquent youth culture--their strong sense of 
community and their desire for freedom--to reveal more 
specifically how youth cultures challenged the party's efforts to 
educate and involve all youth in a new communist society. 
Travellers to the Soviet Union in the 1920's often commented 
on the droves of dirty and poorly-clad youth they saw in the 
train stations, markets, and streets. Describing his encounter 
with some besprizorniki in the market, Walter Duranty wrote: 
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"[sluddenly there materializes beside you a group of children, 7, 
10 and 12 years old. They have gnomelike, filthy faces, childish 
eyes, shaggy hair, men's old coats, trousers pinned up or cut and 
ragged. They shuffle together, taking counsel, then swift as 
swallows make one after another a leap for the counter..."(54) 
They survived by begging, stealing food and clothing from markets 
or bags from train stations, picking pockets, practicing 
prostitution, and for those associated with the adult criminal 
world, burglarizing stores and apartments. At night they slept 
grouped together in tar cauldrons (in order to keep warm), in 
. . ,.' railroad cars, under barges, and in an enormous system of 
cellars, called the Catacombs, under a large unfinished building 
right in the center of Moscow. Close to two-thirds of them were 
fully orphaned, many of their parents having died during the war 
and famine, or having simply abandoned them in the streets of 
,... ... famine-stricken cities while they searched elsewhere for food. 
Most of these youth drank and smoked heavily and some were 
habitual drug users, cocaine and morphine being the most common. 
-. .. . 
One of the most commonly noted characteristics of the 
besprizorniki by contemporary Soviet sociologists, was their 
strong sense of community. They banded together in groups, or 
"communes" as they sometimes called themselves, which varied in 
size from 5 or 10 individuals to groups as large as 600. 
Belonging to a community helped make up for the lack of family as 
it provided for a modicum of economic and social security; the 
food, money and clothing that was taken in a day's work on the 
streets was divided up equally among the group. Collective 
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action of some kind was also necessary as "working" the bazars, 
stealing, or running scams at train stations often required the 
mutual cooperation of at least three hesprizorniki. One would 
attack the vendor, one spill'.over the wares and the third scoop 
up the goods. The continued social cohesion of the collective 
was encouraged by the development of simple organizational 
structures. Within the larger communes in particular there was 
ususally a leader who gave out orders and looked after the 
interets of the group, although he rarely interfered in personal 
disputes among its members. Various individuals within each 
large group would carry out his directives and see to different 
communal functions such as keeping watch at night against the 
threat of a police raid or serving as messengers to.other groups 
of besprizorniki or to the adult criminal world. Some of the 
larger groups laid claim to their own parts of the city, with 
exclusive rights to operate in certain markets and streets. 
Smaller gangs would protect their sleeping areas, leaving one 
person behind during the day to defend their rights to a railroad 
car to a particular tar pit. Violation of these territorial 
boundaries could result in skirmishes between groups. 
The besprizorniki's primary loyalty was to their own 
collective rather than to the larger socialist community. They 
resisted all who stood on a different side from them,. be they 
besprizorniki from another gang or adults from the police, 
'Komsomol, or children's homes. In order to protect themselves 
and their secrets from treachery they used great caution in 
recruiting new members, often submitting th-em to physical trials 
and tests before they were accepted. These ranged from beatings 
and insults from older and more powerful members of the 
collective, to ritual forms of testing such as covering the new 
members with a pile of smoking and crackling branches on top of 
which a fire was built. The injunction against informing against 
the group was very strong, and the rare bes~rizorniki informer 
was dealt with harshly. Sometimes they were punished by simply 
no longer being protected by the group from outside violence or 
even arrest. At other times they were physically abused or, 
among the more criminal gangs, even killed, as this popular 
hcsprizorniki song about an informer suggests: 
Middle of the nighttime- 
The wind it was a howling- 
At the hideout was a meeting of the gang. 
These were desperadoes, ' 
Hooligans and- convicts- 
There to find out who it was that sang. 
Hello, oh my Murka! (Name of girl) 
Hello, oh my darling! 
Hello, oh my Murka, and goodbye! 
You squealed, you turned a stooly! 
You sang on us so cruelly! 
So take you bullet now, for you must die! 
Was it all that awful- 
Here with us together? 
Were all the rags we gave you still too few? 
So what was it that made you 
Take to that police dog- 
And go and turn us in to the Cheka?... 
Hello, oh my Murka! 
Hello, oh my darling ... 
Some communal customs separated one group of bes~rizorniki 
from another, while others separated the entire community from 
the rest of Soviety society. The latter was particularly true fo 
the use of jargon and ritual acts and phrases. Bes~rizorniki 
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jargon was largely the same throughout the Soviet Union, 
facilitating the frequent migrations of homeless youth from north 
to south in the summertime. Common words such as girl, train, 
and ruble were rendered incomprehensible to non-bes~r izornlkx, . . 
helping to preserve their separateness. A 10 ruble bill, for 
example, was called a yosh', or a "louse;" fifty "lice" meant 50 
ten ruble bills. Ritual acts and phrases also helped seal the 
bonds of the besprizorniki community. Two contemporary Soviet 
sociologists argued that words could sometimes take on the 
character of actions for the bes~rizorniki, and in certain cases 
act as a "living barrier" to violent action or retribution. 
Normally, for example, a youth who had lost or stolen the 
belongings of another, such as a pack of cards or a book of 
matches, would be abused and placed in dependence to the owner's 
wishes until he had paid that person back. If, however, right at 
the moment of confrontation the debtor repeated the ritual 
phrase, "precisely I, when I want, how I want, where I want, what 
I want," then he was freed from retribution and allowed to pay 
back for the item as he desired. 
The bes~rizorniki's sense of an exclusive community was a 
direct threat to the ~olsheviks' efforts to create a larger, more 
inclusive, socialist community as the besprizorniki developed 
their own alternative set of common communal norms, laws, and 
cultural consciousness which, although not explicitly political, 
actively resisted the norms and behavior of the rest of Soviet 
society. While the Bolsheviks emphasized responsibility, work 
and communist morality, the besprizorniki rejected the 
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proletarian work ethic and developed instead their own brand of 
tough, street-smart independence, which explicitly included 
swearing, smoking, drinking, and sexual promiscuity. 
An important part of this bes~rizorniki culture was the 
glorification of freedom from authority and responsibility, as 
compared with the Bolshevik emphasis on solidarity and the 
surrender of individual desires for the good of the collective. 
Their desire for freedom, and resistance to Bolshevik norms and 
efforts to reeducate them, were manifested in their common 
opposition to any efforts to put them in children's homes or 
communes. They would scatter all over the streets and into side 
alleys to avoid capture by groups of Komsomol youth who would 
periodically try to round them up and take them into orphanages. 
Many were put in children's homes only to escape to the streets 
again. These institutions were generally despised as places that 
restricted one's freedom, and youth who did live there were 
considered "pretty boys" and "goody-goodies" by those still on 
the loose. In one carefully researched novel about the 
besprizorniki; Children of the Street, the group leader Amelka 
says: "A chap wants to learn a trade and they push a tank with 
frogs and goldfish in front of him...And they tell him to make 
toys out of clay. ..And then there are rules too...We are used to 
smoking tobacco and eating tasty things. But there it is all 
different, it's all boring government issue stuff: clubs, 
pictures, dances. That's nonsense." (114) 
Early Soviet criminologists, psychologists, and party 
figures argued that besprizorniki resistance to education and 
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their retreat to criminality were desperate responses to economic 
and environmental hardships left over from the pre-revolutionary 
era and inflamed by the allied blockade and the Russian civil 
war. The bes~rizorniki were seen not as criminals, but as 
victims, as "sick children, spoilt by an ugly environment and 
education." This implied that they did not actively choose to be 
homeless or criminal, but were forced into this kind of behavior 
out of a need to survive. However, while economic factors 
clearly did play an overriding role in creating the mass of 
homeless children in this period, some youth consciously chose 
this lifestyle as well. Out of 480 criminal and homeless youth 
arrested in a Transcaucasian town, only 116 accepted the offer to 
renounce their vagabond lives for a job in a factory or 
government, the rest preferring to stay on the street. (Zensinov, 
p. 119) Soviet sociologists themselves described how important 
the appeal of freedom was to orphan youth already on the street 
and even to youth from "good," working-class families who would 
leave their homes and jobs to join the street children in search 
of adventure and independence. One sociologist argued that these 
youth believed tha the economic difficulty of living on the 
street was more than compensated for by a feeling of independence 
and of freedom from authority. He wrote that for the 
besprizorniki, "the demands of society, their elders, .and 
teachers did not exist; they are their own masters and know only 
their own morality. (~rasuskii, p. 238) This kind of active 
resistance by the besprizorniki to Bolshevik authority 
contributed to the party's ultimate inability to reabsorb and 
11 
reeducate the bes~rizorniki by cultural and educational means 
alone. 
A crucial aspect of the concept of hegemony is that it 
encourages us to look for relations of power and struggle in 
whole new areas of social life. As Raymond Williams argues in 
Marxism and Literature, "[wlhat is decksive is not only the 
conscious system of ideas and beliefs, but the whole lived social 
process ..." (p. 109) Youth cultures are a vital part of this 
lived social process and play a central part in the search for 
hegemony. The Bolsheviks hoped that the cultural development of 
Soviet youth on every level of their lives--leisure, education, 
sexuality, family--would contribute to the creation of a 
communist consensus and a common working-class culture. Instead, 
the hgsprizorniki, and other cultures of Soviet youth, resisted 
Bolshevik efforts to educate them into a singularly socialist 
consciousness. While the Bolsheviks clearly remained dominant, 
their constant inability to solve the problem of the 
prizorniki throughout the 1920's emphasized the limits of 
their social control. The search for socialist transformation 
and communist hegemony would be a long and difficult one--not 
something that could be achieved in the single revolutionary 
moment of October 1917, or even in the revolutionary decade 
following it. 
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Despite analogous labor processes, American coal and metal 
miners developed sharply contrasting union political traditions. 
Both groups of miners formed militant unions in the 18901s, but 
where the coal miners' United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) 
embraced the liberal reform movement of the progressive era, the 
metal miners' Western Federation of Miners (WFM) advocated 
socialism: and where the UMWA became one the strongest affiliates 
of the American Federation of Labor, the WFM founded the 
revolutionary syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World. These 
political differences remained remarkably consistent throughout 
the twentieth century. 
When I began this research I anticipated that the new social 
history would provide clues about the origins of these 
distinctive political formations. Dissatisfied with the 
subordination of rank and file workers to union organizational 
forms and economic markets in the old institutional labor 
history, as well as the subordination of workers to technology 
and processes of capital accumulation in the labor process 
literature, social historians have placed the variegated cultures 
and experiences of rank and file workers at the center of their 
analyses. 
Although I have found that traditions and experiences did in 
fact vary, I have also come to believe that the new social 
historians have overcompensated for the errors of their 
predecessors. Where institutional historians and labor process 
theorists pay little attention to role of rank and file workers 
in the process of working class formation, social historians 
often pay little attention to the role of employers in that 
process. In a trenchant critique of the new social history, 
Lawrence McDonnell accuses the influential Herbert Gutman of 
portraying workers and capitalists as "two civilizations which 
sometimes squabble but never embrace, as brothers or as deadly 
enemies" (1984, p.636-637). 
Interestingly, it is E.P. Thompson, regarded by many as the 
principle source of inspiration for social historians, who argues 
most eloquently against one-sided approaches to political 
analysis - - be they top-down or bottom-up. According to 
Thompson : 
There is a sense in which rulers and crowd (in 
nineteenth century England) needed each other, watched 
each other, performed theater and countertheater in 
each other's auditorium, moderated each other's 
political behavior....Is there some deeply embedded, 
"structural" reciprocity here? (1974 p.402). 
- That very "structural" reciprocity provides a framework for 
explaining divergent union political formation in the two mining 
industries. I argue that coal and metal miners had very 
different experiences with their employers at the point of 
production, during strikes, and within their communities and that 
these divergent experiences explain the marked contrasts in the 
politics of the UMWA and WFM. These divergent class experiences 
were not randomly distributed; they were, instead, structured by 
the nature of relative class capacities in the two industries. 
Both coal employers and coal miners had weak class capacities, 
while employers and miners in the metal mining industry had 
strong class capacities. Divergent relative class capacities 
were not only shaped by cultural traditions, as the social 
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historians suggest, but by uneven markets and processes of 
capital accumulation, as institutional historians and labor 
process theorists suggest. 
Virulent competition was the principle cause of coal 
employers' weakness. The high demand for coal during the Civil 
War coupled with low capital requirements motivated hundreds of 
small capitalists to open mines. The abundance of coal near the 
earth's surface obliterated the need for expensive deep mining 
equipment and coal, in addition, required virtually no market 
preparation. 
By the end of the war, however, the productive capacity of 
the industry far exceeded the demand for coal. Excessive 
competition and overproduction crippled the coal industry, 
driving profits down. In the words of one employer, "(tlhere are 
some fundamentals which the employer should know by this time but 
which many persistently forget .... The enemy of labor is capital; 
the enemy of capital is labor and other capital" (Quoted in Black 
Diamond August 10, 1910, p.21). 
Collective action to raise prices would have minimized coal 
employers' plight, but employers lacked organizational 
leadership. It was not a lack of large employers that accounted 
for the void in leadership, but rather the fact that large size 
did not count for much in the coal industry. Larger employers 
were vastly outnumbered by small employers -- 85% of the mines 
operating in Pennsylvania in 1889 were small "country banks" ( E M  
June 13, 1891, p.696) -- and coal deposits varied considerably in 
quality. Small producers with favorable geological conditions 
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were quite capable of capturing the markets of their larger 
competitors. 
Despite weak market and organizational capacities, coal 
employers were militant in their relations with miners. Rather 
than collectively addressing their disputes with labor, 
disorganized coal employers sought individual solutions. In 
particular, they relied on company houses and stores for added 
profit and as a mechanism of labor control. Approximately two- 
thirds of all bituminous coal miners lived in company houses in 
the 1880's and 1890's  ash 1982, p.43 f.n. 40). Even small 
employers built inexpensive homes and established credit 
agreements with independent merchants who were assured of miners' 
patronage (Magnusson 1920). 
Dependence on employers weakened the capacities of miners. 
With low wages and seasonal employment, most miners experienced 
chronic debt. Miners relied on credit from employers during lean 
times and feared that if they struck they would "be both out of 
work and out of a home" (UMWA Secretary and Treasurer W.C. 
Pearce, U.S. Industrial Commission 1901, p.98). 
Despite the risks, coal miners in Pennsylvania, Indiana, 
Illinois, and Ohio, the major coal producing states, participated 
in 1,705 strikes between 1881 and 1886. Less than one-third of 
these strikes were successful (see Table I). 
Disenchantment with company stores, company homes, and low 
wages provided the incentive for resistance. According to one 
miner, by forcing miners to patronize company-dominated 
institutions and then charging exorbitant prices, employers were 
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committing a double crime: "It is depriving a man of his liberty, 
and then punishing him for being a slaven (Black Diamond October 
1885, p.9). 
But a sense of injustice alone does not explain why coal 
miners were willing to risk their jobs and homes. American 
miners were also exposed to union traditions imported by British 
miners. By 1870, immigrant coal miners from Great Britain 
accounted for approximately 50% of all miners in the major coal 
producing states (u.S. Census 1870, p.719-765). British union 
leaders encouraged miners who had been blacklisted or locked out 
of mines in Scotland and the North of England to emigrate 
(Gottlieb 1978). Thus, the United States'probably received 
British miners who had been among the most active in the British 
miners' union. That union, the Miners' National Association of 
Great Britain, was strongly influenced by the Chartist movement 
(Roy 1905; Boston 1971; Fisher and Smethurst 1978). 
British union traditions were easily transferred to the 
United States because competition among British coal employers 
was excessive and British miners experienced constraints similar 
to those of their counterparts in the United States. The Miners' 
National Association of Great Britain advocated a cooperative 
agreement with employers to co~llectively raise prices and wages 
(Fisher and Smethurst 1978). Believing that a similar plan was 
viable to alleviate poverty among American coal miners, British 
immigrants, many with close ties to union leaders in Great 
Britain, organized the first national coal miners' unions in the 
United States (Roy 1905; Gottlieb 1978). A cooperative union- 
employer plan to regulate prices and wages became the foremost 
goal of organized miners in the United States until the 1930's 
(UMWJ May 31, 1894 p.2; Wieck Papers Box 15, Knights of Labor- 
Coal). 
For many years, American employers resisted the plan and 
instead blacklisted known union organizers and members. As a 
result, British-influenced unions in the united States faltered, 
driving some coal miners into the competing Knights of Labor. 
The Knights were no more successful, however, since their utopian 
vision, cross-class organizing, and commitment to secrecy 
precluded attention specific trade issues (Coleman 1943). 
Coal employers and miners remained locked into a pattern of 
futile militancy for much of the 1880's. The presence of "free- 
riders" prevented durable employer organization (U.S. Industrial 
Commission 1901; Olson 1971; Bowman 1985) and competition between 
the British-influenced miners' union and the Knights of Labor 
resulted in numerous failed strikes (ROY 1905). 
In desperation, the competing unions began talks of a merger 
in 1886. This alarmed employers who embarked on a campaign to 
convince miners that a cohesive union would only exacerbate their 
poverty. According to an article in the employers' trade 
journal : 
[~iners] are, as a rule, an intelligent and law-abiding 
class, except when their good sense is subverted by the 
wild ravings of the so-called "guides." For they know 
that when it is impossible to get a whole loaf, they 
had better obtain a half one than have no bread at all 
 i lack Diamond October 15, 1889, p.210). 
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Coal miners were not convinced by their employers' logic, perhaps 
because they had little knowledge of that half loaf, and the two 
unions merged into the UMWA in 1890. 
For much of the 18901s, the UMWA was unable to deliver its 
promises to coal miners. In 1897, however, poverty had reached 
shocking proportions in the coal fields and the UMWA risked a 
national wage strike. The UMWA had less than 4,000 members and 
no strike fund but 150,000 coal miners responded to the strike 
call and shut down the coal industry in the major coal producing 
states (UMWJ October 1, 1965, p.11). The national and local 
presses as well as a legislative commission reported that miners 
were destitute and their employers dishonest, inhumane, and 
incapable of managing the affairs of their industry. Faced with 
a losing battle, employers agreed to organize themselves and to 
meet with UMWA representatives annually to agree on prices and 
wages, the very plan British miners had introduced over thirty 
years earlier. 
The success of the plan depended on the UMWA's ability to 
keep their employers organized in order to prevent price cutting. 
The UMWA achieved this by discouraging strikes and radical 
political commitments. 
Metal miners had no need or desire to organize their 
employers. In contrast to the East, the metal mining industry 
was highly concentrated. In 1902, for instance, just 7% of 
Colorado's mining companies were responsible for 80% of the 
state's total hardrock mineral production (~euschatz 1986, p.50). 
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Unlike coal mining, metal mining required considerable 
capitalization. In addition to the cost of developing mines that 
often reached depths of 1,000 feet or more, precious metals 
required expensive milling and smelting procedures before they 
were marketable. 
Large employers began organizing almost as soon as they 
entered the industry. Employers claimed that organization was 
necessary in order to keep metal miners from "dictating" the 
affairs of the industry (Idaho Springs flews September 11, 1903,. 
p.3). Indeed, one historian claimed that metal mine employers 
organized as the only alternative to turning management entirely 
over to miners (~yman 1978, p.53). 
Metal miners enjoyed substantial control over their wages, 
working conditions, and within their communities. Miners had 
established these traditions prior to 1870 when the industry was 
dominated by self-employed placer miners. Placer mining required 
little capital investment and offered incomes that far exceeded 
those of workers in the East (Paul 1963; Neuschatz 1986). 
Since the West was undeveloped prior to the discovery of 
gold, independent miners created the first western industrial 
communities (~euschatz 1986). Miners' courts, originally 
designed to monitor claim theft, provided one of the few means of 
organized social control. Metal miners also provided fire 
protection, law enforcement, libraries, and entertainment 
(Colorado Bureau of Labor Statistics 1887-88, p.83; Paul 1963). 
Even after the placer deposits were exhausted and corporate 
capital dominated the industry, miners retained their privileged 
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position in local communities. with the exception of copper 
mining communities, there were few company towns in the West 
(~llen 1966; Brown 1979). The lack of pre-existing competition 
attracted numerous independent businessmen to the West and miners 
remained the largest single occupational group in communities and 
the most cohesively organized (1rey 1951, p.85; Jameson 1987, 
p.518). Moreover, organized employers typically did not live in 
the communities in which their mines were located (~ameson 1987, 
p.64-65). 
Miners began organizing into local unions with the 
transition from self-employment to wage labor in the 1880's. 
Initially, these unions, which sought to preserve high wages and 
work autonomy, were very successful. For example, in 1889 the 
average annual earnings of metal miners in five western states 
were twice as high as the annual earnings of coal miners in the 
four major coal producing states, even taking into consideration 
more stable employment in metal mining (See Table 11). Moreover, 
in contrast to the 1,705 coal mining strikes between 1881 and 
1886, the U.S. Commissioner of Labor recorded only three metal 
mining strikes in five states during that time. All three 
strikes were in protest of a wage reduction and all three were 
successful (see Table 111). 
Organized employers attempted to change the prevailing 
pattern of class relations in the early 1890's. For example, the 
1892 strike in Idaho, which inspired the amalgamation of local 
unions into the WFM, began when employers changed the method of 
payment for underground work. Miners had traditionally insisted 
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that all underground workers faced the same dangers and should 
receive the same compensation for the risks they took. When 
employers challenged that tradition by lowering the wages of less 
skilled workers, miners and employers began the first of ten 
violent and protracted labor wars that dominated the industry 
until 1904. In all but one of these strikes employers received 
assistance from state officials while miners received local 
assistance (Suggs 1968; Wright 1974). 
Metal miners and metal mine employers were formidable 
opponents. Employer-supported state militias engaged in violent 
combat with miners who were themselves organized into battalions. 
After twelve years of such battles with no end in sight, 
employers and the militia in Colorado, where the WFM was 
headquartered, deported striking miners across state lines. "You 
better not return," military officials warned the deported men, 
"for something might happen to you1' (Denver Post, June 15, 1904, 
p.1). 
There is little question that experiences like these shaped 
the politics of the WFM. Within months of the 1904 deportation, 
metal miners approved by 80% a referendum to organize and 
affiliate with  the'^^^, a revolutionary organization that 
stressed direct action at the point of production. 
With very different experiences behind them, coal and metal 
miners entered the twentieth century with very different 
political goals. The strike of 1897, for instance, became 
memorable to coal miners precisely because it broke the pattern 
of futile militancy that miners and employers had been locked 
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into for several decades. similarly, metal miners' affiliation 
with the IWW represented the culmination of twelve years of 
intense struggle between well organized employers with access to 
state political resources and well organized miners with access 
to political resources within their communities. 
But coal and metal miners' sharply contrasting union 
politics suggests that industrial militancy and political 
radicalism are not synonymous. Instead, the politics of the UMWA 
and the WFM were shaped by the experiences of rank and file 
workers at the point of production, within their communities, and 
during strikes. These experiences were structured by the 
relative class capacities of workers and employers. 
Implicit in this analysis is a conceptualization of class 
capacities as the degree and form of interconnectedness within 
class fractions (Stark 1980). Thus, class capacities encompass 
both organizational potential and the content of that 
organizational potential. This interpretation of capacities is 
only partially consistent with the existing literature on class 
capacities. Most theorists, either implicitly or explicitly, 
argue that class capacities are generated from the mode of 
production; employers derive strength from the process of capital 
accumulation while workers derive strength from association with 
one another  right 1979; Therborn 1983). There are two problems 
with this interpretation of capacities. First, employer 
capacities are often seen as unproblematic and undifferentiated 
across fractions of employers. Braverman (19741, for instance, 
assumes that because of their objective position in the class 
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structure, employers are capable of transforming the relations of 
production in accordance with the demands of capital 
accumulation. This view neglects the fact that firms have 
different organizational forms and operate within different 
market and political contexts. All of these factors, as well as 
possible cultural differences among segments of capital, mean 
that capitalist class organization is variable and, therefore, 
relations with workers are also variable. A second problem with 
much work on class capacities is the failure to move beyond 
organizational potential in order to seriously examine the 
cultural and experiential components of class organization. 
While it is certainly true that divergent forms of community 
organization in the East and in the West gave coal and metal 
miners different organizational potentials, it is also true that 
coal and metal miners had very different traditions which shaped 
the character of their unions; British union traditions were 
simply not prevalent in the West, for example. 
In short, I am suggesting that relative class capacities 
shape experiences during strikes and during day to day production 
relations and that these experiences, in turn, influence union 
politics. I am also suggesting a more encompassing definition of 
class capacities which recognizes that it is not necessary to 
neglect the insights of older theoretical traditions in order to 
address faults in those traditions. More specifically, 
traditions and patterns of community social organization 
influence class capacities but uneven markets are also pertinent. 
Finally, the approach that I am suggesting is neither top-down 
13 
nor bottom-up, but more akin to E.P. Thompson's notion of 
structural reciprocity and his theater-counter-theater analogy. 
Table I. Success of Coal Strikes in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania by Cause, 1881-1886. 
Cause Successful Unsuccessful 
Wage-Related 
Working Conditions 27% 
(12) 
a Includes 89 strikes classified as partially successful. 
Source: United States Bureau of Labor. Third Annual Report of 
the Commissioner of Labor, 1887. Strikes and Lockouts 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1888) 
Table 11: Average Daily Wages, Average Days Worked, Average 
Annual ~arnings by State, 1889; Coal Miners, Gold and Silver 
Miners. 
State Daily Wages Days Worked Annual 
Earnings 
Coal Miners 
Illinois $1.95 177 
Indiana $1.89 175 
Ohio $1.95 181 
Pennsylvania $1.93 210 
Gold and Silver Miners 
Arizona $3.17 215 
Colorado $3.08 244 
Idaho $3.59 206 
Montana $3.48 292 
Nevada $3.60 248 
Source: United States Census, 1890. Mineral Industries in the 
United States p.350; 59-60. 
Table 111. ~ e t a l  Mining Strikes, 1881-1886. 




1884 Against Wage Reduction Yes 
1883 Against Wage Reduction Yes 
1884 Against Wage Reduction Yes 
Source: United States Bureau of Labor. Third Annual Report of 
the Commissioner of Labor, 1887. Strikes and Lockouts 
(washington: Government Printing Office, 1888): 
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